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THE STATE AS A SECULAR PHENOMENON
Erhard Mock*
In all his works Julius Stone has always put stress on the importance of historical reflection. Therefore, the author wishes to
dedicate to Professor Stone this essay which deals from a Continental point of view with the historical background of one of the most
fundamental principles of the modem state. This is the development of the secular character of the state. The essence of this. process (which predated the rise of the Continental democracies) is that
the state as such is not to be identified with any religious or ideological position, thus guaranteeing the plurality of society.
Since Otto Brunner's notable work Land und Herrschaft was
published, one has ceased to apply the word "state" to political
societies of former historical periods. In other words, we have become aware of the historicity of the phenomenon "state." We get a
better understanding of the middle ages when we realize that these
political communities were not states. This approach has lain bare
the roots of the modern state.
In the times of the vast European migrations, the Church
seemed to be the only carrier of culture, civilization and education.
Therefore, this period is rightly called the Christian period. Political
and religious communities began to form a synthesis. These two
types of communities were represented by the renewed empire, and
the Roman Pope. In spite of the fact that Charlemagne's empire
soon split up, Christendom remained the principium unitatis, that
is, the only uniting bond of the Occident. The unity of Christendom
was felt to be the unity of the Church. In the ninth century Hincmar of Reims wrote that one should not speak about various kingdoms but only about one, which is the Church. 1 This conception
of unity is theologically well based: some statements in the epistle
to the Ephesians (e.g. about one god, one faith and one baptism;
about some aspects of the teachings about Christ, mainly the
dogma of Christ's corpus mysticum) and Augustine's idea about a
Civitas dei became concepts with an immediate relevance to the
political order. 2 This idea arises clearly from a document of the
times of Frederick II the Hohenstaufen: ecclesiam et imperium
* Research Assistant, Salzburg University; Dr. Jur., University of Vienna.
1. Mock, Intoleranz und Toleranz der Christianitas, INTERNATIONALE FESTSCHRIFT FOR
ALFRED VERDROSS 371, 372 n . 6 (1971).
2. Cf., Schmolz, Societas civilis sive Respublica sive Populus, 14 OsTERREICHISCHEN ZEITSCHRIFT FOR 0FFENTLICHES RECHT 29 (1964) .

Published by SURFACE, 1975

3

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 3, No. 1 [1975], Art. 11

124

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 3:123

esse unum et idem et mutuis se debere vicissitudinibus adiuvare. 3
The political and the religious community coincided nearly completely. The legal status in one of these communities conditioned
the legal status in the other. Excommunication as the Church's
legal sanction supported the empirical outlawry, and vice versa. 4
In early Christendom it was self-evident that all law was
founded in God. In many aphorisms and poems God and law are
regarded as identical. One has to remember that the Landrecht of
the Sachsenspiegel (1230) starts with the divine installment of the
two powers, the Pope and the Emperor. We often find in chronicles
the accusation that someone acted "against God and the law." 5 This
theonomically founded order was not only "Christian," in the sense
that Christendom was regarded as the basis of the political order,
but also in the sense that this order was sacred and immediately
based on religion. It was regarded as a sacred order which included
both spheres, the terrestrial as well as the transcendental, which did
not yet differentiate between categories such as "spiritual" and
"secular" or "church" and "state." 6 The Christian Roman empire
was not immediately based on a imperial Roman tradition, even
though it seemed to all appearances derived from it. The empire as
"ecclesia" was intended to signify the kingdom of God on earth.
This bipolarity of Emperor and Pope in a religious-political
order, where the Emperor as well as the Pope was the patron of
Christendom and a sacred person, contained the seed of schism. It
was the first achievement of the young science of theology to make
a distinction between the spiritual and the secular, between
"spiritualia" and "temporalid." This distinction became the main
weapon in the so-called investiture-struggle. The representatives of
the Church claimed the entire sacred sphere for themselves, as
well as their legally constituted ecclesia. This latter separated itself, as a sacred-hierarchic institution based on canon law, from
the previous all-embracing unity of Christendom. However, the
claim for the liberty of the Church (libertas ecclesiae), meaning
the Church's emanicipation from the secular sphere, meant the
arrogation of the world's leadership. The Emperor, as well as the
secular political power, was eliminated from the ecclesia. The Em3.
4.
5.
6.

Mock, supra note 1, at 372 n.8.
5 P. HlNSCHIUS, SYSTEM DES KATHOLISCHEN KIRCHENRECHTS 398 (1893).
0 . BRUNNER, LAND UND HERRSCHAFT 133 (5th ed. 1965).
F. HEER, AUFGANG EUROPAS (1949), and literature there cited.
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peror ceased to be a sacred person; he became a layman. As far as
his duties as a Christian were concerned, he was under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The Church, on the other hand, remained
free from any secular responsibilities. This new order was clearly
expressed in the so-called Dictatus Papae by Gregory VII. This
development put an end to the sacral concept of the Emperor. The
political order was removed from the realm of the sacred and holy.
This was meant as a devaluation by the curial theoreticians, to refute imperial claims in the realm of the ecclesia, but in the course
of history this conception evolved into the autonomy of the political and secular field. Thus even the scholastic philosophy (as an
ecclesiastical movement) gave up the conception that law was primarily based on God. This was done under the influence of the
re-discovery of Aristotle's works. Law was now derived from the
nature of creation understood as an autonomous order. In Thomas
Aquinas's opinion, God acts by means of nature. 7 God is no longer
the immediate starting point of law as was taught in bygone times,
but rather human nature is. In the same way, the political community is ontologically founded in man's nature, as man is conceived as animal naturaliter politicum et sociale, as Aristotle had
taught. 8 From this relative autonomy of law, it was only a short
way to the theory of Marsilius von Padua, a partisan of the German
Emperor. Marsili us theorizes about theology only when he writes
to remind theologians that their proper province is the beyond,
and hie et nunc it is their duty to be good subjects to the Emperor.
In his Defensor Pac is, he tries to prove that no dispute is necessary between the secular and the spiritual power, if only each respects the competences of the other. However, the church is to
exercise its task under the patronage of the political power. Marsilius of Padua conceives, following Aristotle, the political communities (which he calls "regna" or "civitates") as democracies. It was
Marsilius' conviction that an elected Emperor would be the best
governor (genus electum principatus). In this context it is of great
interest that the elected "princeps" is bound by statutory law.
According to Marsilius, the primary and efficient cause for the law
is the people or the totality of citizens or the major part of them
chosen by their election or their will (expressed in a general assembly), which under secular punishment orders that something
7.
8.
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has to happen in the realm of human behaviour, or that something
is not to happen. 9
Marsilius von Padua proves the anticipation of democratic and
legitimate elements in connection with the secular autonomy of
politics to be visionary. Compared with the severity with which the
struggle of investiture was fought, the immediate historical and
political results were relatively unimportant. The terminological
differentiation between "spiritual" and "secular" was blurred by
the fact that the new Christendom, now divided into "temporalia"
and "spiritualia" continued the old traditions in the form of the
sacral unity of church and state (for instance the act of coronation).
In this connection the autonomy of the secular meant only that law
and political community ceased to be part of the sacred and holy.
They both were deprived of their immediate orientation towards
eschatology and the Incarnation but their basic religious significance was preserved. The release of the political community from a
religious foundation took place only in consequence of the crisis
which began with the Reformation in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries.
The understanding of religous belief as a quasi-legal relation of
loyalty, plus the continued influence of the Christian idea of unity
closed the way to toleration in the period of religious struggles. Thus
it was unavoidable that the solution of this religious problem became a matter of politics. In the Empire, it was mainly the differences between the Emperor and the estates and, in France, the
Huguenot wars which brought about a purely secular community
whose legitimation was based on secular principles, i.e. the state in
the modern meaning of the term. The differentiation between spiritual and secular, which first was made by the Popes (in order to
justify the ecclesiastical supremacy) became the claim for the primacy of national politics. No wonder the political power of kings
and sovereigns, which did not see itself as secular, took care of
spiritual matters, putting these under their custody in order to secure law and order. In times of religious struggles a peaceful order
and internal security could only be guaranteed through breaking
free from the struggling religious parties. One has to keep in mind
this necessity, if he wants to understand the principle "cuius regio,
eius religio" (in the empire), the territorialism of the protestant
ecclesiastical doctrine or as Hobbes's theory of state. 10
9. Aile Zitate und Obersetzungen Nach der Ausgabe uon Richard Scholz, Marsilius uon
Padua, Defensor Pacis I, 12 § 3 cited in 1 E. REIBSTEIN, VoLKSSOUVERANITAT UND
FREIHEITSRECHE 34 n.20 (H. von Claudieter Schott ed. 1972).
10. E. BOCKENFORDE , Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Siikularisation, in
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It is not necessary here to deal with the details of religious
struggles. In this connection it is rather of interest to pay attention
to the development of the special political thought which arose from
the theories of the so-called "Politiques," (the French jurists) who
understood the state as an entity and a concentration of power. In
contrast to scholastic jusnaturalism, they based their ideas on a
formal concept of peace, a concept which did not derive from the
idea of a "life in truth" but from the contrast between peace and
civil war. In consequence of the horrors and disasters of these struggles, peace became an obviously justified value. In order to guarantee peace, Bodin claimed the summa potestas for the king for the
internal sphere of government as well as for the external field. It was
again Bodin who posited religious unity as a value of second rank
in his "Republic." Bodin said that in case of religious schisms the
wisest sovereign should act in the same way as a good pilot who lets
himself drift with the stormy sea, because he knows that his resistance would cause a shipwreck. 11 Bodin undertakes to justify his
opinion by giving a lot of examples from history. Thus he mentions
the Emperor Theodosius I and his relations to the Arianists. He also
quotes the Gothic kings Theoderich and Cassiodor and refers to the
Orient, where different religions lived together, more or less in
peace.
In another work Bodin gives even clearer expression to the trend
of the new times. Here I mean his work H eptaplomeres, where Bodin
describes a discussion of seven wise men on religion. The conclusion
of this work is the relative value of every religion, which leads to the
relativism of ideas on justice. From then on there were no fixed
concepts of justice, but as many ideas of justice as there were religious parties. In view of these difficulties-if not impossibilities-to
determine what is just, the positive and written law had to gain in
importance. The positive law, being the only guarantee of peace and
order in these troubled times, therefore did not appear as unjust,
but as inequitable and rigid. In any case it was the minor evil. The
growing prestige of positive law, which was thought of primarily as
statute law, gave rise to the concept of a mutual relation of protection and obedience (later systematized by Hobbes). The position of
statute law moved into the center of constitutional theory. But
SAKULARISATION UND UTOPIE
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while any derivation of law from material norm contained an element of insecurity and was regarded as dangerous and legally irrelevant, positive law gained in value, and a sort of "formalism" began
to prevail in legal thought until it reached its climax in Hobbes's
Authoritas non veritas facit legem .12 In other words, justness of positive law depended solely on enactment by the competent authority.13
In the French Revolution, the type of state which had been
envisaged during the religious civil wars was revived for a short
time. In the Declaration of Human Rights in 1789, the state was
conceived as a "Corps social." Its legitimation was neither thought
of as deriving from historical tradition nor from a divine precept nor
from the service of truth; the only legitimation was to be found with
reference to the self-determined individual. Amongst the freedoms
for whose preservation and safety the state exists, freedom of belief
and religion were included in the French Constitution of 1791. Thus
in regard to religion the state appears to be neutral. It freed itself
completely from religious authority and moved religion into the
sphere of society.
The state's emancipation from religion is, however, to be distinguished from the so-called separation of church and state. In principle there are three ideal forms this separation might take. In the
course of the revolutionary developments of the great French Revolution the possibility of a laicism with anti-religious tendencies
arose. The two other possibilities are either a moderate system of
an established church or an amicable separation of the two spheres.
When we regard this separation we are above all faced with the
question of the significance of the secularization of the political
community. This development is in fact an extended process of
emancipation of the secular order from religious authority and
connection. With the Declaration of Human Rights this process was
completed. There the position of the individual is only determined
by himself and his freedom. It becomes obvious that this concept
of human rights granted by the state shows aporetic structures; for
conscience-originally only valid in the religious sphere-can now
be directed against the new state. Thus the modem state is based
in the principle of freedom of conscience-a principle which may
even act against the state.
12. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, c. XXVI.
13. Cf. R. SCHNUR, DIE FRANZ<'.ISISCHEN JURISTEN
JAHRHUNDERTS 69 (1962).
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